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Precaution in multilateral environmental agreements 
and its impact on the World Trading System







Much has been said about the precautionary principle.  Despite numerous formulations of the principle in multilateral environmental treaties​[1]​ and an abundant doctrine attempting to grapple its meanings​[2]​, the principle remains vague and elusive.  The content and nature of the precautionary principle give rise to considerable controversy.  Many of the characteristics of this emerging legal norm are still shadowy. 

This situation does not overshadow the significance the principle has gained over the years in the development of both international and domestic environmental law.  In fact, the search for a “common understanding” of the precautionary principle is probably useless since a prudent attitude in the face of scientific uncertainty will manifest itself differently depending on the specific sectors and risks involved​[3]​.  One thing appears sure though: the precautionary principle is undergoing a phase of normative crystallization​[4]​.  It has been included in an increasing number of legal instruments.  Public decision-makers refer to it almost systematically in the field of environmental protection and public health when justifying measures taken in situations of scientific uncertainty as regards to risks.

Even though formulations of the precautionary principle have been the object of much variations, a common point of reference can be found in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which reads: “[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”.

Nowadays, the debate surrounding the precautionary principle is largely perceived as relating essentially to the position it should occupy with respect to the rules of international trade.  Trade represents a fundamental challenge to the precautionary principle in practical terms, as the conflicts the interaction of both gives rise to seem unavoidable.  The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief review of what that interaction has been so far and how it was dealt with in situations of conflict on the international scene. 

The precautionary principle finds its origins in environmental law, and as such was not fashioned with any particular regard to the body of rules regulating international trade.  Although it gives rise to conflicts with international trade norms, the precautionary principle did not come into being as a response to them or to exert an influence on them.  Quite to the contrary, the contours of the precautionary principle have been shaped to ensure the protection of the environment and human health under circumstances that were traditionally ignored by environmental law – situations of scientific uncertainty.  Specialists in the field of environmental law and environmental protection in general developed the more specific parameters of the precautionary principle, such as the triggers in terms of scientific proof and gravity of damages.  Nevertheless, as we shall see in the first section of this chapter, it cannot be said that the evolution of the precautionary principle is not linked in some ways to trade interests.  This situation appears obvious when considering the influence those interests might have exercised in the drafting of the precautionary principle in several recent multilateral environmental agreements (1).

In shaping the future of the precautionary principle, the role of international jurisprudence appears essential, as conflicts between competing versions of precaution will need to be resolved.  The second part of this chapter addresses the issue of the status of the precautionary principle as it appears through case law at the international level.  The precautionary principle is a polymorph idea with huge potential, like the concept of fault in civil law or principles of general application in public law such as the audi alteram partem rule and the dicta against bias of public officials.  In the same way those principles and concepts were given more specific substance over decades and centuries of judicial interpretation, the meaning of precaution needs to be shaped by jurisprudence, be it at the international or domestic levels.  Also like general concepts and principles of civil and public law, the exact interpretation and application of the precautionary principle will be closely tied to the facts of each situation where it is invoked​[5]​.  There is no doubt that it is through cases relating to trade rules that uncertainties still surrounding the status of the precautionary principle within the norms of international law will be progressively clarified (2). 


1.	Crossed influences between the precautionary principle and trade interests in multilateral environmental agreements

The confrontation of a normative principle with the rules of international trade is quite another matter than the constitution of the principle itself.  Confrontation results from the pressure the new principle put on trade norms, particularly in the environmental field in the case of the precautionary principle.  The coming into being of the principle is an event necessarily prior to the conflicts in which it is involved.  This raises the question of the possible crossed influences between the precautionary principle and international trading norms, in the context of the current phase of crystallization of that principle.  It appears that in sectors where economic interests seem most important, the general trend of consolidation of the precautionary principle is somewhat restrained (1.1.).  On the other hand, the most recent instruments relating to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) show that however powerful the economic interests may be, if there is a risk of irreversible damage, the precautionary principle can nevertheless be the choice of the majority of States (1.2.).


1.1.	Trade interests as a resistance to precaution

It is significant that references to the precautionary principle do not appear in every recent multilateral environmental agreement where it would have been legitimate to see it included.  The absence of absolute systematization does not call into question the process of normative consolidation of the precautionary principle.  Like any other international norm, the precautionary principle does not need an absolutely concordant application in practice for it to eventually be recognized as part of customary law​[6]​.  On the other hand, the fact that the precautionary principle is not systematically mentioned in international instruments related to environmental protection, and more particularly in multilateral environmental agreements, is a sign of resistance to it.  The silence of some agreements in regard to the precautionary principle is not a random occurrence, but the result of actual pressures. 

The precautionary principle first appeared in a sectorial and regional framework: pollution of the marine environment in the North-East Atlantic, and initially in the North Sea.  The work undertaken under the auspices of the OECD in the 1980s on the growing pollution of the North Sea, had as its purpose to seek a solution to the inadequacies of the system of quotas for pollution discharge, then in place under the applicable legislation​[7]​.  The complex issues raised by the capacity of the marine environment to absorb such pollutants and the as yet rather unreliable nature of scientific knowledge, combined with the consideration given to the risk of damageable outcomes, justified the introduction of a new approach.  This approach would result in the taking of restrictive measures against potential pollutants, even though neither the existence of damages nor the causal link between those damages and the pollutants had been established with certainty.  There was no real obstacle to this approach, so serious was the potential exposure to damaging outcomes.  The approach, adopted as an OECD​[8]​ non-binding instrument, was then adopted in the framework of conventional law applicable to the entire North-East Atlantic​[9]​.

As a meta-legal principle par excellence​[10]​, the precautionary principle reveals a change in the law arising from confrontation with new social fears, which have necessarily been conducive to a move from prevention to anticipation​[11]​.  The fear​[12]​ of the consequences attached to new technologies, such as genetic engineering or the potential for damage to the global environment discovered at the end of the last century, have led to a change in the way behaviour is regulated.  There is no longer any question of abstaining​[13]​ from decision-making when faced with a risk due to events over which there is still too little control.  Although there may be doubt in regard to the final occurrence of potential damage, the increase in the risk factor, combined with the gravity of the damage likely to occur, form the basis of application of the precautionary principle.

The precautionary principle is becoming increasingly enshrined in law, at least in its more restrictive interpretation, insofar as it represents a means to apprehend scientific uncertainty.  At this point precisely, it goes beyond the traditional principle of prevention​[14]​, whose application is restricted to situations where risks are known and identified.  In practice, it is a manifestation of a profound change affecting the structure of the international legal system.  That system is henceforward no longer based only on the known – under an approach frequently criticized as being in lag of reality –, but encompasses the anticipation of what may occur, doing so out of an intent to ward off possible and more serious damaging outcomes.  Be it as part of the law of the sea​[15]​ or more generally on environmental protection​[16]​, the development of the precautionary principle represented the translation into legal terms of the new demands imposed on a risk-based society.

As an ethical value penetrating the body of the law, it is true that the precautionary principle may give rise to excesses.  When simply expressed, it is emblematic of a reasonable attitude, which appears to be a formalized yet common sense approach.  It begs agreement as a self-evident truth.  It is then but a short step to interpreting it as an absolute imperative.  Detractors are fiercely opposed to it, as the alleged shackles of a bygone age impeding all forms of progress.  Nevertheless, in a society facing potential aggression from imperfectly assessed hazards, which may impact both on its present reality​[17]​ and upcoming evolution​[18]​, the precautionary principle seems to be at the same time a means to avoid the errors of the past, and a reassurance in the face of an unpredictable future​[19]​.  Therefore, it appears that neither the historical development nor the object of the precautionary principle are directly related to international trading considerations.

In multilateral environmental agreements, the precautionary principle appears for example in the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 2001​[20]​, in the two Protocols to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979, relating respectively to Persistent Organic Pollutants and to Heavy Metals, adopted in 1998​[21]​, in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer​[22]​ and more particularly in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity of 2000​[23]​.

Another trend exists though, characterized by a resistance to the precautionary principle, in areas where issues in economic terms are of particular consequence.  As a result, the precautionary principle may not be adopted, or if so, in an attenuated form or in an indirect way. 

One of the most significant examples of this trend is the Declaration of Principles on Forests.  This is the only instrument adopted at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development that does not include the precautionary principle.  The tenacious opposition of the main countries working in timber and forestry, such as Indonesia, and the representatives of the timber industry, prevented not only the adoption of mandatory instruments at this time, but also stood in the way of any reference to the precautionary principle, which was perceived as an impediment to business in this sector​[24]​. 

For similar reasons, although a treaty was signed, negotiations concerning trade in toxic substances gave rise to the same outcome.  The Convention of Rotterdam​[25]​ organized trade in toxic substances by introducing procedures of informed prior consent, but did not go so far as to include the precautionary principle.  At most, this instrument deals with precautions required as part of the management of the risk from toxic materials​[26]​. There is no question that the trade and use of toxic substances can give rise to damages in a context of uncertainty as regards risks.  However, the informed prior consent procedure, while it may be perceived as one of the applications of the precautionary principle in certain circumstances, is nevertheless not a necessary manifestation thereof.  In the context of this particular instrument, the procedure agreed upon seems to be one that reflects the idea of prevention rather than being based on precaution.  Clearly, there was a barrier standing in the way of the application of the precautionary principle.  The signs of such a barrier can be traced throughout the preparatory work leading up to the Convention.  Not one of the 11 reports of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee mentions the precautionary principle​[27]​.

The Kyoto Protocol on climate change​[28]​ is another recent instrument that does not mention the precautionary principle.  It is to be remembered though that the Protocol in itself may be perceived as an application of the precautionary principle, as no scientific certainty has emerged yet on the exact causes of climate change. But the lack of direct reference to the precautionary principle in the text of the Kyoto Protocol, in opposition to some comparable instruments, may be seen as a reflection of the significance of economic interests in this sector.  While reference was made to the uncertainties surrounding our knowledge of climate change, no inference was openly made that there should be no barrier to the adoption of precautionary measures​[29]​.  The negotiating Parties agreed on the technical implementation of the precautionary principle in terms of concrete measures taken to limit the emissions of greenhouse gases, but not on its direct​[30]​ normative recognition. From this point of view, it is interesting to note that some draft measures which did adopt the precautionary principle, were not finally included​[31]​. It is true that commercial interests exerted heavy pressure against the making of economic sacrifices to keep down greenhouse gases.  Nevertheless, the pressure exerted was no greater than for the GMOs. The reason is that, with GMOs, we are confronted with the very basis of the precautionary principle: risk of great damage.


1.2.	Precaution and GMOs: the prevalence of fear of risk over trade interests

Of itself, the inclusion of the precautionary principle in a multilateral convention relating to environmental protection, adopted in 2000, comes as no surprise, given the general move toward its normative crystallization.  Nevertheless, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety breaks new ground considering the enormous pressure put on the States by the commercial interests involved in the use of modern biotechnologies in the food and agriculture industry.  It is paradoxically in an area of extensive underlying commercial and trading interests that the precautionary principle has in the recent past been more solidly rooted.  Not only does the Cartagena Protocol on the prevention of biotechnological risks make express reference to the precautionary principle, but it does so in several different ways. 

The Protocol preamble draws attention to the fact that the Parties have, with this instrument, appropriated the content of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration​[32]​.  This wording is found in other similar treaties​[33]​. Still less surprising is the adoption of the wording of the precautionary principle in the provisions on risk management​[34]​, as this is the primary intent of the protocol.  On the other hand, Article 1 of the Protocol breaks new ground.  The first provision in the treaty, symbolically introducing the document, deals with the general purpose of the Protocol.  That purpose is expressly based on the precautionary principle, and is drafted as follows:
“In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movements”.

This marks a notable advance with respect to the crystallization of the precautionary principle.  That principle is no longer solely adopted as a technical mechanism for the regulation of the risk of damageable outcome, in an area laden with uncertainty, nor is it a general guideline for the conduct of States.  The principle henceforward becomes an objective to be pursued by the Parties.  The difference is important, and translates into the fact that the States are not required simply to draw their inspiration from the principle, but to act “in accordance” with it, in the practical field of the regulation of the cross-border movements of GMOs.  In the draft, “in accordance” is an advised choice, and was the subject of careful negotiation.  The “Miami Group”, a gathering of the major biotechnology producing States, was opposed to this formulation and wanted to see it replaced by the wording “taking note of the precautionary approach”​[35]​. This wording would have signalled a far less well defined obligation than the one finally adopted.

The representatives of the GMO producer States were also opposed to making multiple references to the precautionary principle in the draft of the Cartagena Protocol. In this respect they were in part successful.  The dispute focussed essentially on the draft Article 8 (7) relating to the decision-making procedure​[36]​.  As in the original draft, this measure was based on the precautionary principle, or at least on the formulation thereof derived from Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration​[37]​.  The measure as adopted in the definitive text, Article 10 (6), takes up the content of the earlier draft, but in wording which does not directly allow the importing Party to prohibit the import of a living modified organism (LMO) in the event that there is no scientific certainty regarding its potentially harmful effects.  In this case, the option open to the importing Party, according to the draft, will be restricted to “taking the appropriate decision”​[38]​.  Arguably though, the “appropriate decision” could very well be in a particular situation the prohibition of import, despite the change of vocabulary that occurred during the negotiations of the Protocol.

Nevertheless, one feature of the negotiation remains striking: many negotiating States made pronouncements on the principle and they were all favourable, not only to the new approach encompassed by the protocol, but also to its inclusion in a binding multilateral instrument on the transport and movement of LMOs​[39]​.  Canada, although one of the main producing countries, actually acknowledged that the Protocol was the expression of the precautionary principle as such, emphasising the degree to which the Protocol was in the spirit of that principle​[40]​.  The “spirit” was also one of the main arguments put forward by the “Miami Group” in support of the view that it was unnecessary to make multiple references to the principle​[41]​.  In actual practice though, the outcome was that the producing countries expressed in some ways their approval with the inclusion of the idea of precaution in regulating living modified organisms (LMOs) on the international scene, although they would not have rendered the precautionary principle as binding as it actually is in the adopted instrument.

The inclusion of the precautionary principle in this field of activity was supported by the precedent of the Convention on Biological Diversity​[42]​, and by a number of sectorial instruments, which also relate to the protection of biodiversity, such as the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds​[43]​.  The first steps to the inclusion of the precautionary principle had therefore been taken in the years prior to the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol. 

The current state of affairs reveals a boundary being in fact drawn between those areas in which changes in consciousness are occurring and where the application of the precautionary principle is called for as a matter of necessity, and the majority of other fields which are grey areas, onto which the precautionary principle will be grafted as and when the balance of opposing forces allows.

Transboundary movements of LMOs is a special case, situated on that fine demarcation where a preventive approach is not sufficient, confirming the need to move on to a precautionary approach.  LMOs represent a core concern in their own right, and inspire fear as to the potentially irreversible nature of any damageable outcome should it ever occur​[44]​, and do so irrespective of any parallel economic interests. 

The threshold at which a potentially damaging outcome might occur, now becomes a fundamental criterion.  Although the precautionary principle was not in any systematic way formulated for the purpose of apprehending the risk of irreversible damaging outcomes​[45]​, a number of instruments limit its application to that context​[46]​.  It would appear that, at least in some sectors, only the most serious outcomes would justify the adoption of the precautionary approach.  This is tantamount to saying that, in the case of scientific uncertainty, the precautionary principle will be invoked, if not always, at least when faced with the risk of the most extensive damage.

Determination of the threshold of gravity of potential damage is no easy matter.  Practice among States has nevertheless thrown light on an important point, by making a distinction between the gravity and the irreversibility of a potential damaging outcome​[47]​.  Particularly severe damage is not necessarily irreversible, and vice versa.  It therefore remains to be determined whether the threshold for the adoption of the precautionary principle is reached by the cumulative combination of the two criteria, or whether a degree of severity or of irreversibility in their own right will suffice.  But the potential for damaging outcome from GMOs is emblematic of the worst-case scenario.  The gravity of the damage which such organisms could entail, and more particularly the likelihood that such damage will be irreversible, conducted the States to adopt a rather strong version of 
the precautionary principle in the Cartagena Protocol. 

The transboundary movement of LMOs is a sector that differs in one essential point from the others.  There is no overriding need to adopt new production techniques based on biotechnology, considering the risks that they may generate.  Forcing the introduction of products when there are weighty suspicions that they may either be harmful to health, or give rise to changes in the natural environment, will not only generate feelings of insecurity, but also represents an unwarranted limitation of the freedom of choice of citizens and consumers.  The particularly high profile reaction in Europe, in opposition to the systematically authorized dissemination of LMOs that occurred for instance in some GMO producing countries, is the result of a legitimate fear that the introduction of LMOs would render impossible the access to foods previously available in their full variety and richness.  The same situation does not, for example, apply in the field of greenhouse gas emissions, as no viable equivalent to fossil sources has yet been found which can basically fuel heat and transportation, both for private and business purposes.  Here the argument based on necessity does not carry the same weight as it does for LMOs. 

However, the shift to a new approach is not complete, even in the case of the recent regulations on GMOs.  Resistance survives in this field too, as demonstrated by the work undertaken by the FAO.  The Codex alimentarius​[48]​ and the different committees of the FAO undertaking studies and proposing lines of conduct in regard to the many questions raised by the use of GMOs​[49]​, do not base their findings on the precautionary principle, but on the technique of substantial equivalence.  The weight of producer States within the FAO, and the longstanding use of this technique exert full power in favour of the status quo and against the precautionary principle.

It can nevertheless be foreseen that a move toward the precautionary principle, even in these arenas, could take place in the future.  There are substantial signs of this, among them reference to the precautionary principle by some in the FAO​[50]​, and the questions raised about the method of substantial equivalence by States which currently adopt that method.  But change, if it were to take place, will not in all likelihood occur in the immediate future​[51]​.  The voices raised in the FAO are not among the most decisive, and although dissent in regard to the principle of substantial equivalence has at least been voiced in Canada​[52]​, it has not spread everywhere​[53]​. Concrete developments have yet to occur.





2.	The challenge ahead for international tribunals: resolving conflicts between competing versions of precaution

The status conferred in international law to the precautionary principle has been the object of much debate.  Some authors have suggested that the principle has gained the status of customary law, especially considering the impressive number of legal instruments, both at the international and regional levels, where it has been included​[55]​.  It cannot be denied that the multiplicity of formulations of precaution through binding and nonbinding instruments certainly ascertains its role as one of the leading new directions given to international environmental law in recent years​[56]​.  Nevertheless, it can be assumed that it is mainly through conflicts arising from the confrontation of precautionary measures and other internationally formulated rules that a more definite answer to that question will be articulated.  International adjudicators and courts will inevitably play a major role in accomplishing that task.  The precautionary principle has already been invoked in several litigations at the international level.  The scope of this paper does not permit a review of all of them​[57]​ but two of the most significant cases are analyzed below, one emanating from the International Court of Justice, the other from the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (2.1).  In terms of interactions between the precautionary principle and trade law rules, the actual conflicts that can result from the release into the environment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) command a special attention (2.2).


2.1	The Danube Dam Case​[58]​ and the Hormones Case​[59]​

It is worth noting that the precautionary principle has not been recognized so far as a rule of customary international law either by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO), despite the fact that both instances had the opportunity to consider its relevance in litigations concerning potential threats to the environment or human health.  Some believe that the Gabcikovo Nagymaros has been a “missed opportunity” in that respect​[60]​.  The conflict submitted to the ICJ originated in 1989 when Hungary suspended and abandoned the project it had agreed to carry out jointly with Czechoslovakia, as it was then known, for the construction and operation of a Barrage System on the Danube River, pursuant to a Treaty and some related instruments entered into between the two countries in 1977.  When Hungary abandoned the work, Czechoslovakia proceeded unilaterally with a temporary solution, by diverting the waters on its territory into a canal.  Then the realization of more work without the need for any intervention into or by Hungary was designed to satisfy the needs of Czechoslovakia for the production of electric power​[61]​.  That unilateral action by Czechoslovakia led to another type of action by Hungary, which decided to terminate the treaty in May 1992.  In the summer of 1993, after the dissolution of the State of Czechoslovakia into Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the succession of States that resulted, the dispute was referred to the ICJ by a special agreement entered into between the governments of Slovakia and Hungary.  The decision of the ICJ was rendered on September 25, 1997.

In its decision, the Court makes no mention whatsoever of the precautionary principle​[62]​ even though the Court explicitly relies on the concept of sustainable development.  This concept is used by the Court as an effort to reconcile its ruling that Hungary violated its treaty obligations by refusing to pursue the construction of the dam with Slovakia with the reasons invoked by Hungary for such refusal.  Hungary pretended that no adequate environmental assessments had been performed as to the project and that significant risks to the fauna and flora of the Danube River and to the water supply of the city of Budapest would be created by the construction and operation of the dam.  Given the growing opposition of its citizens to the project, Hungary decided not to continue with the building of the dam, and justified its violation of the treaty contracted with Czechoslovakia, as it was then known, by invoking a “state of ecological necessity”​[63]​. 

The Court, relying on principles of customary law, recognized that a state of necessity precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation could be triggered by a “grave and imminent peril” to the environment​[64]​, although it considered there was no sufficient proof submitted before the Court in the present case as to the reality, the magnitude and the certainty of the threat invoked​[65]​.  The defense could not be accepted as the strict conditions imposed for its recognition were not met, especially the presence of a “grave and imminent peril”​[66]​.  

The Court reviewed the evidence submitted by both parties and considered that the dangers invoked by Hungary remained uncertain and mostly of a long-term nature, and that therefore they were not “imminent”​[67]​.  Consequently, the Court found that “Hungary was not entitled to suspend and subsequently abandon, in 1989, the works on the Nagymaros Project and on the part of the Gabcikovo Project for which the 1977 Treaty and related instruments attributed responsibility to it”​[68]​.  The Court also decided that the unilateral conduct of Slovakia in putting into operation its solution constituted an internationally wrongful act​[69]​.  Finally, the Court rejected Hungary's claim that it was entitled to terminate the treaty in 1992, due to a fundamental change of circumstances​[70]​.  Consequently, the Court declared that the Treaty of 1977 was still valid between Slovakia and Hungary and that both Parties would have to seek agreement on the terms of execution of the judgment.  In that respect, the Court proceeded to determine what the future conduct of the Parties should be. 

It is in that part of the decision that the Court makes its most explicit references to international environmental law.  In enjoining the Parties to negotiate and reach an agreement as to the way the Project should be carried out, the Court mentions the necessity to pursue the multiple objectives of the Treaty in a joint and integrated way, as well as the standards of international environmental law and the principles of the law of international watercourses.  In a well-known passage of its decision, the Court recognizes that “[t]his need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development”​[71]​. 

In clarifying that situations of scientific uncertainty as regards risks should not lead to the application of the defense of “ecological necessity”, the Court excluded the possibility of invoking in the future the precautionary principle in that context.  In a separate opinion perceived by some as “a breath of fresh air”​[72]​, Judge Weeramantry relies most exclusively on principles of international environmental law and gives significant meaning in particular to the concept of sustainable development​[73]​.  For two authors, the Danube Dam decision leads to the conclusion that “[…] rather than being a leader in the development of international environmental law, […] the [ICJ] will be more of a commentator with only occasional separate or even dissenting opinion having the potential to have a major impact on the development of the law”​[74]​.

It should be remembered though that the International Court of Justice may not be well equipped to deal with highly technical matters involving the analysis of scientific data, as was the case in the Danube Dam litigation​[75]​.  The Court”s reliance on treaty law to solve the dispute, instead of invoking other sources that would have appeared more “modern” in the circumstances, can be explained in part by the conservative stance the Court usually takes in its judgments.  It can also be explained by the fact that the Parties themselves did put great emphasis on treaty law in the proceedings.  As for the precautionary principle, the decision was rendered in 1997, only five years after its inclusion in the Rio Declaration.  In retrospect, this would have made very short notice for a more formal recognition of it by the Court.

In any event, the silence of the ICJ regarding the precautionary principle and its status in the Danube Dam Case had great consequences a few months later, in the Hormones Case.  In that case, the WTO’s Appellate Body​[76]​ refused to consider the precautionary principle as a rule of customary law, relying instead on the specific text of the SPS Agreement and the more restrictive approach to precaution it contains to invalidate the ban taken by the EC over the import of certain meat and meat products containing allegedly carcinogenic substances.  That prohibition of imports affected particularly cattle breeders in Canada and the U.S.A. where the incriminated substances were administered to farm animals as growth promoters.  Those two States filed a claim at the WTO against the measure taken by the EC, pretending it established an unjustified discrimination against the imports of meat and meat products from their countries and constituted a disguised restriction to international trade.  The Appellate Body relied primarily on the wording used in the SPS Agreement​[77]​ to reject the European arguments to the effect that the measure was necessary to protect the health of its population and was as such justified by article 3 (3) of that Agreement​[78]​.  The Appellate Body considered that the EC measure did not meet the strict conditions imposed by the SPS Agreement, as insufficient scientific evidence had been presented to support its validity​[79]​.  No adequate risk assessment had been performed to establish the so-called risks generated by the use of the substances, as requested in particular by articles 5 (1) and 2 (2) of the SPS Agreement​[80]​.  The EC measure was therefore considered inconsistent with the requirements of Article 5 (1)​[81]​.

In that case, the precautionary principle was invoked by the EC in an attempt to overlook the clear wording of the SPS Agreement in regard to the necessity of scientific justifications.  For the EC, any doubt raised by a dissenting opinion in the scientific community as to the existence of a risk could trigger the application of the precautionary principle and justify a measure of protection.  The EC argued that the precautionary principle had become a rule of international customary law or a general principle of law that would transcend the text of the Agreement.  The Appellate Body, without denying the importance the precautionary principle might have gained in international environmental law, refused to make any pronouncement as to its status within the norms of international law” Citing abundant authorities, it explained:
“The status of the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges.  The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general principle of customary international environmental law.  Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international law appears less than clear.  We consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract, question.  We note that the Panel itself did not make any definitive finding with regard to the status of the precautionary principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at least outside the field of international law, still awaits authoritative formulation”​[82]​.

Nevertheless, this decision must not be regarded as a total rejection of the precautionary principle.  Quite to the contrary, the Appellate Body in fact took great care in trying not to limit its own possibilities of using the principle as an interpretive tool if necessary in the future.  Firstly, it recognized that the SPS Agreement does incorporate the precautionary principle through article 5 (7), as regards to temporary restrictions to trade for the protection of human, animal or plant health​[83]​.  It also acknowledged the fact that different populations may have different levels of tolerance towards risks.  Therefore, the decision of a State to impose a sanitary or phytosanitary measure that is more protective than what is recommended by international standards or by other Member States must not be perceived in itself as discriminatory or as a disguised restriction on international trade​[84]​.  Finally, when commenting the “reasonable relationship” that must exist between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, the Appellate Body stated that the measure does not necessarily need to be based on scientific “mainstream” opinion but may as well be based on the opinion of scientists taking a divergent view.  It explains:
“Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific community.  In some cases, the very existence of divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have investigated the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of scientific uncertainty.  Sometimes the divergence may indicate a roughly equal balance of scientific opinion, which may itself be a form of scientific uncertainty.  In most cases, responsible and representative governments tend to base their legislative and administrative measures on ‘mainstream’ scientific opinion.  In other cases, equally responsible and representative governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected sources”​[85]​.
In its Report, the Appellate Body added that divergent opinions within the scientific community might be particularly important to consider when the risk involved is life threatening and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety​[86]​.  As argued in the following section, this statement could be interpreted as opening the door to protective measures taken against the potential threats posed by GMOs released into the environment or present in human and animal food.


2.2	GMOs and risks to the environment: a definite need for precaution

Arguably, the whole discussion about the status conferred to the precautionary principle within the norms of international law remains interesting because conflicts involving competing versions of precaution are likely to increase.  If the precautionary principle is ever declared to be a rule of customary law by an international tribunal, this decision could change the outcome of a conflict between precautionary measures taken for the sake of the environment or human health and international treaty obligations in the field of commercial law. Two valid international obligations – one resulting from customary law and the other resulting from treaty law – would then have to be weighed against one another. If possible, they would need to be interpreted and applied in a way as to give meaning to both. For instance, in a case where a precautionary measure restricting the commercial flow of a product would be both temporary and based on scientific justifications, there are good chances it could be considered valid under the exception to the circulation of products created by paragraph 5.7 of the SPS agreement. 

The conflict would be more acute if the commercial restriction does not appear justified under the wording of the commercial law treaties such as in the case of a permanent measure of containment based on fear of a potential threat emanating from a product or substance. If that fear is not substantiated by scientific findings sufficient to constitute an exception under the trade law treaties, the real conflict arises, insofar as a rule of customary law would validate the adoption of precautionary measures under that particular set of circumstances. In other words, the precautionary principle as recognized by customary international law could very well be more generous in terms of the protection it offers against potential risks to the environment and the human health than the “watered down” version so far accepted as a restriction under commercial law treaties. Which rule of international law would prevail in such a situation, the one established by custom or the one negotiated through a multilateral trade agreement? 

In terms of possible conflicts between different versions of the precautionary principle at the international level, the issue seems more likely to arise through litigation concerning the confrontation of two treaties, a commercial treaty for one part and a multilateral agreement for the protection of the global environment for the other part. As previously seen, those situations will become more frequent as several multilateral treaties including versions of the precautionary principle have recently come into effect or will do so in the very near future​[87]​. What would then be the outcome of the conflict, if one party pretends that the restriction imposed on a product for the protection of the environment or human health is justified under the environmental treaty, as the other party argues that the restrictive measure does not qualify as an exception to the rules of international trade law? Once again, in the face of scientific uncertainty, two different formulations of the precaution principle could collide, eventually forcing an international jurisdiction – most likely established under the WTO dispute resolution procedure – to decide whether in that particular case it would rather ensure protection of the environment over the liberalization of trade, or the contrary.

Of course, in the event litigation arises between Parties to a trade law agreement and a multilateral environmental agreement, the court or panel should first try to reconcile both treaties in order to avoid the conflict in the first place. For instance, the court could interpret the two confronted instruments as providing for the same kind of trade restrictive measures should a potential threat to the environment exist. If a uniform interpretation were not possible, the jurisdiction would then need to give priority to one treaty over the other, and to one vision of precaution over the other. In the absence of any hierarchy set out by the treaties themselves​[88]​, the court or panel would probably be required to apply general rules of international law relating to the interpretation of treaties (the newest treaty over the oldest one, and the specific treaty over the general one)​[89]​. Arguably, if both parties were really committed to the protection of the global environment, this could become a non-issue, as litigation would not be likely to arise. If  conflits occur anyway, in most cases they should be resolved in favour of the protection of the environment. As one author affirms : “this is perhaps the most obviously resolved issue in the entire spectrum of conflicts between trade and the environment”​[90]​. 

The situation becomes trickier when the trade law conflict originates from a restrictive measure decided unilaterally by a State to protect its environment or the health of its people.  If a multilateral treaty relating to the protection of the environment or health does not otherwise permit the measure of containment, its validity as a restriction to trade law rules will be determined pursuant to the trade law treaty (provided both Parties have ratified the treaty). For example, this was the case in the Hormones litigation. If the measure is taken pursuant to a multilateral environmental agreement to which the claimant in the trade law conflict is no Party, technically, the conflict should be resolved under the treaty that applies to both Parties to the litigation, meaning the trade law agreement.  In such a case, it could be argued that the MEA Party is defending an obligation erga omnes that should prevail over the trade law rules.  As discussed before, it could also be argued that a customary rule of international law could emerge so as to justify the containment measure under a more generous version of the precautionary principle as the one set out in the trade law regime.  A final option for harmonizing environmental considerations and trade law rules would involve an evolution of the precautionary principle through the interpretation given to trade law exceptions by the WTO panels/Appellate Body.  The Appellate Body made clear in the Hormones case that all possibilities of integrating the precautionary principle through judicial interpretation of the trade law treaties as they are presently drafted might not have been exhausted so far​[91]​. 

Those three possibilities could very well be invoked or at least discussed in the upcoming litigation between three GMO producer countries (Argentina, Canada and the U.S.A.) and the EU over the trade restrictive measures taken in the EU to limit the commercialization of GM foods and crops​[92]​.  We are of the opinion that this litigation is more likely to find solution by extending the precautionary principle as presently recognized in the SPS agreement​[93]​. 

In no other battle than the one surrounding the release into the environment of genetic seeds and the commercialization of genetic seeds and food has the conflict caused by the management of risks and the introduction of the precautionary principle been more acute. A prudent attitude towards uncertain risks has led the European Communities to adopt the precautionary principle in the management of the risks posed by GM food and seeds. This situation first materialized as a moratorium concerning new authorizations of such technologies, as long as structures designed for a more complete evaluation of the risks involved were not properly put in place​[94]​. This has been done by new legislations adopted by the EC​[95]​, which have permitted the lift of the ban. Nevertheless, the procedure chosen by the Europeans to evaluate and manage the risks of GMOs reflects a very cautious attitude towards risks. For example, a new GM seed would be authorized for the deliberate release into the environment and the “placing in the market” in the EC only after the applicant manufacturer has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the competent authorities the “safety” or “lack of harm” of his product​[96]​. The proof of the complete absence of risk being scientifically impossible, the European Commission stated in its Communication on the precautionary principle that precautionary measures may be adopted when there are “reasonable grounds for concern” or when there are “valid reasons to consider” that there may be a risk​[97]​. The legitimate desire of the European populations to know what they are eating and their willingness to exercise appropriately their right to choose, has also led to the adoption of a regulation imposing a mandatory system for the traceability and labelling of GMOs and GM products​[98]​.

Helped by a strong European position, the precautionary principle was also incorporated into the procedures designed to evaluate and manage the risks posed by the transboundary movements of living modified organisms (LMOs) (at the present, mainly seeds and grains) through the Cartagena Protocol​[99]​. Pursuant to that multilateral instrument, a country (“party of import”) could decide to refuse the transboundary movement of LMOs onto its territory if there is a lack of scientific certainty as to the existence and magnitude of the risks involved, either to health or the environment. However, the party of import must proceed with a risk assessment in accordance with article 15 before taking a decision​[100]​. Even though scientific justification appears central in the decision of the importing State, as the assessment must be carried out in a “scientifically sound manner”, the parties to the Protocol have also recognized the fact that the collection of sufficient data concerning the risks posed by LMOs is not always possible. In that regard, Annex III to the Protocol states that: “[l]ack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk”​[101]​. In the end, the importing country must take a decision to authorize or refuse the transboundary movement onto its territory and, as stated by Article 10, paragraph 6 :  “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism in question […] in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects”.

One difficult question that remains unanswered is whether or not the Cartagena Protocol allows a Party to refuse the transboundary movement of LMOs in the case of an apprehension or fear of a risk for which there is no scientific evidence. It can be argued that the European position, in clearly separating the assessment from the management of the risk, can lead to a restrictive decision toward an LMO in a situation of “ignorance”. As one author puts it, “there is always a possibility that outcomes never considered might arise”​[102]​. It has been said that the precautionary principle should not be invoked in situations of ignorance, as this “would transform it from a tool for decision-making to a tool to prevent decision-making”​[103]​. On the other hand, it is also recognized that precaution can be a responsible answer to a risk whenever science and risk assessment have met their own limitations: “ignorance” should be distinguished from “indeterminacy”. Scientific knowledge comes by “freezing” the surrounding context of risk or uncertainty and making pre-analytical assumptions that may or may not be valid​[104]​. In other words, precautionary measures could be the answer when indeterminacy remains important, even after the realization of a risk assessment. Arguably, this will often be the case concerning the risks posed by GM seeds to the related species and other components of biodiversity, as the “chain reaction” that could be the end result of their release into the environment appears so unpredictable.

The wording used in the Cartagena Protocol seems to allow for a clear distinction between the two phases of assessment and management of risk. In case of indeterminacy of a risk, it certainly can be argued that the Protocol “[recognizes] that decision-making is, ultimately, based not only on scientific information but also on value judgments and other considerations that may vary widely among countries and regions”​[105]​.

The conflict between that approach and the one advocated so far by the WTO Appellate Body - the necessity of a scientific justification involving more than a mere apprehension for permanent measures restricting the commerce - will need to be resolved in the future. In the particular claim of the three GMO producer countries – Canada, USA and Argentina - against Europe, chances are the arguments will be analyzed under the trade law agreements instead of the Cartagena Protocol since the three countries are not parties to the latest instrument.  The scope of this chapter does not allow for a detailed evaluation of that particular conflict.  Our comments will be limited to general considerations only. 

It is hoped that when confronting the trade law rules with the particular risks posed by GMOs, the WTO panel/Appellate Body will be inclined to adopt a more generous version of the precautionary principle, one that would consider legitimate at least some of the restrictive measures adopted by the EC. As discussed previously, the precautionary principle has been shaped in domestic and international environmental law to deal primarily with those uncertain risks that emerge in the most dramatic of situations, that is those of potentially grave and irreversible damages.  In the case of GMOs, the potential of grave and irreversible damages, particularly to the biodiversity, is combined with the difficulty science has in predicting or confirming the existence of the risk, due to a lack of data.  Given these circumstances, it appears reasonable that if a population is unwilling to take unnecessary risks, its will should be respected.  Restrictive measures towards GMOs should be safeguarded in the name of precaution, even if they are not designed to be temporary and if the scientific justifications for them appear thin. The potential risks posed by GM seeds and food command the application of a strong version of the precautionary principle.

In conclusion, it can be instructive to review some of the turmoil that has emerged on the Canadian agricultural scene in recent years due to the massive use of GM crops on Canadian soil​[106]​.  At the international level, Canada is one of the most active promoters - along with the USA – of the use of biotechnologies in agriculture.  The claim filed against the EC certainly comforts that position.  At home though, the Canadian government is facing growing opposition by its population that condemns the ease with which biotechnologies are introduced in Canada.  Well-respected institutions – including government agencies – have published studies that point out to the possible long-term damages to biodiversity that could result from the use of GM seeds in agriculture​[107]​.  Those studies denounce the application made in Canada of the concept of substantial equivalence in the authorization procedure towards GMOs and support the idea of incorporating elements of the precautionary principle into that procedure​[108]​.  Another issue which is highly debated in Canada is the labeling of GM food which is not mandatory at the moment, despite the fact that Canadian consumers would prefer deciding for themselves what they should and should not eat​[109]​.  Finally, it becomes more and more obvious for the ordinary Canadian that the risks to the environment resulting from the introduction of GM seeds have been underestimated in Canada, despite reassurances from the Canadian government, the biotechnology industry and their experts. 

Two major litigations involving lands contaminated by the accidental “drift” of genetically modified seeds have been the object of much media attention in Canada.  The fierce battle one farmer from Saskatchewan led against multinational biotechnology giant Monsanto in a suit for patent infringement has been reported internationally​[110]​.  In a divided judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada decided in favor of Monsanto against Schmeiser​[111]​, but many commentators have pointed out the necessity to modify patent law as it now stands in Canada as well as in the United States in order to protect farmers against such suits when GM crops have contaminated their lands​[112]​.  Another litigation not yet decided involves a class action by certified organic farmers from Saskatchewan suing two biotechnology companies for damages resulting from the widespread contamination of their crops by GM canola cultivated in neighboring farms​[113]​. The organic farmers also asked for an injunction to prevent the commercial introduction of GM wheat in Saskatchewan.  There has been a growing movement of Canadian farmers – organically certified or not - opposed to the development of varieties of GM wheat. Those farmers are afraid of losing their export markets should GM wheat be introduced on Canadian soil.  In reaction, Monsanto decided last summer to withdraw its demand for the approval of a variety of GM wheat that was being examined by the appropriate Canadian government agencies​[114]​. 






The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of both the origin and evolution of the precautionary principle in international environmental law and the consequences that result from its interaction with the international trade system.  Even though the precautionary principle has not yet materialized into a rule of customary law, despite numerous formulations thereof in recent multilateral environmental treaties, its importance is nevertheless confirmed.  States are in fact taking measures to protect the environment in the face of scientific uncertainty.  Given the overall context of trade liberalization at the international level, the conflicts likely to arise between environmental protection and the free circulation of products need to be resolved. 

International courts and tribunals – in particular the panels and the Appellate Body set out under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism – are already contributing to the recognition of the precautionary principle and the shaping of its status in international law, and will most likely continue to do so in the near future.  One thing appears striking for the observer on the international scene: the evolution of the precautionary principle has not been restrained despite discordant voices that attack its credibility and its necessity as a legal norm.  One reason that can partly explain the controversies generated by the precautionary principle lies in the fact that its application makes a difference.  As stated by an author: “if it did not, vested interests in the status quo would not expend time and money challenging it”​[115]​. 
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